North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has often struck observers as an unconventional figure in international relations: a nonchalant man seemingly indifferent to the economic hardships his people endure. In reality, he has displayed unexpected cunning—a Machiavellian disposition—that has surprised global leaders.

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Through authoritarian rule, Kim has successfully positioned North Korea—formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—as a notable force in international politics. He has done so by demonstrating flexibility, exploiting rifts among major powers, and modifying alliances as global circumstances change.

After Kim succeeded his father in late 2011, while still in his late twenties, numerous observers predicted that the young leader would not last long. They expected senior officials either to remove him or reduce him to a ceremonial figure. Instead, Kim consolidated his power and established himself as one of the world’s most ruthless political leaders.

As Jung H. Pak explains in the Foreign Affairs article “How North Korea Won,” Kim carried out systematic purges to secure the elite’s loyalty, including the public execution of his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, and the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong Nam. Over the past decade, he has steadily expanded surveillance, coerced labor, and harsh penalties, using fear to maintain “total control” over ordinary North Koreans.

Building on the legacies of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, and his father, Kim Jong-il, Kim has cultivated a self-reliant cult of personality to strengthen his rule. This elaborate mythology portrays him as a legendary revolutionary hero, an astute military strategist, and a compassionate father figure to the nation. The regime spreads this narrative through education, media, literature, and the arts, embedding it in nearly every aspect of daily life and making it a crucial foundation of the country’s distinctive political ideology.

Perhaps Kim’s greatest achievement has been his advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. From 2012 to 2025, North Korea conducted more than 272 missile launches under his leadership and introduced a variety of missiles with increasingly longer ranges—far more launches than occurred under his father and grandfather. Kim also oversaw four of North Korea’s six nuclear tests, culminating in the September 2017 test of what North Korea called a hydrogen bomb.

Analysts estimated that test’s yield at approximately 100–150 kilotons, compared with the roughly 15-kiloton yield of the Hiroshima bomb. On July 4, 2017, North Korea successfully conducted its first flight test of the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), marking a major advance in its long-range missile capabilities.

In February 2025, U.S. Northern Command and NORAD Commander Gen. Gregory M. Guillot before the Senate Armed Services Committee that North Korea’s newly tested Hwasong-19 solid-fueled ICBM probably could deliver a nuclear payload to targets throughout North America. Its solid-propellant design could also reduce U.S. pre-launch warning time.

Since its founding in 1948, North Korea has sought to assert its sovereignty and independence while pursuing international recognition and prestige. In doing so, it has tried to counter the perception that it remains a “shrimp among whales” surrounded by powerful neighbors.

A pivotal moment in North Korea’s pursuit of international legitimacy came with the 2018 North Korea–United States Singapore Summit, where U.S. President Donald Trump met directly with Kim Jong Un. The meeting gave Kim unprecedented access to a sitting U.S. president and elevated North Korea’s diplomatic profile on the international stage.

More recently, the DPRK has sought to prove its reliability to other authoritarian regimes. It has reportedly supplied Russia with short-range ballistic missiles and more than 15 million artillery rounds while deploying thousands of troops to support Russian forces.

This alignment became particularly visible in Beijing, where Kim met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping during China’s September 3, 2025, military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II. The gathering underscored North Korea’s expanding strategic relationships, showcased its military relevance, and signaled Pyongyang’s growing political importance within an increasingly fragmented international order.

Yet for all the regime’s diplomatic and military gains, Kim Jong Un understands that North Korea’s future remains uncertain.

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Kim has worked to establish the DPRK as a de facto permanent nuclear-armed state, modernize and expand its conventional military capabilities, and sustain an economy that has shown considerable resilience despite sanctions and isolation. Even so, succession may pose the greatest long-term challenge to his legacy.

His daughter, Kim Ju Ae, increasingly appears to be the regime’s presumptive successor. Thought to be in her early teens, she now appears frequently in state media and accompanies Kim on official visits, including military inspections.

In February 2026, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service assessed that Kim had begun positioning her as his successor. The agency cited her growing presence at major political and military events, along with indications that she had begun expressing views on state policy.

Nevertheless, the prospect of a woman eventually assuming the position of supreme leader presents an obvious challenge in a deeply patriarchal system. The aging military leadership may not readily accept a female supreme leader.

At the same time, recent personnel changes complicate the notion that senior military leaders constitute an independent or oppositional bloc. Kim Jong Un replaced Defense Minister No Kwang-chol with Kim Song-gi and restored veteran strategist Pak Jong-chon as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Those moves instead suggest that Kim continues to consolidate and manage the military elite from above.

A similar tension appears in the regime’s approach to the donju—wealthy entrepreneurs who operate semi-independently within North Korea’s informal market economy. Pyongyang appears intent on drawing these actors into a more nationalized and institutionalized economic framework while still relying on the wealth and commercial networks they have built.

Recent reports that donju now operate ostensibly state-run grain shops illustrate this contradiction particularly clearly. The regime wants to harness private wealth without surrendering the state’s claim to economic control.

This effort should be multinational, drawing on capabilities in South Korea, Japan, European democracies, and the private technology sector. Programs should prioritize methods that minimize risks to North Koreans and their families. Scholarships and professional opportunities for North Korean defectors should also help develop expertise that could contribute to a future transition.

The Cold War showed that deterrence and containment can effectively manage a hostile regime without necessarily changing it. Military strength, sanctions, and diplomacy remain crucial tools for dealing with North Korea; however, none of them alone will likely determine the country’s future political direction.

The U.S. and its allies should adopt a long-term strategy toward North Korea that combines deterrence, targeted economic pressure, engagement, expanded access to information, human-rights advocacy, elite signaling, and contingency planning. Rather than trying to force regime change from outside, that strategy should aim to ensure that, if the DPRK’s political system eventually begins to change, Koreans themselves can shape a peaceful and orderly transition.

North Korea’s greatest long-term weakness may ultimately arise not from its economy or military capabilities, but from uncertainty over succession and the Kim regime’s future. Consequently, U.S. policy should focus on ensuring that, when that pivotal moment arrives, North Koreans have viable alternatives to maintaining the current system indefinitely or descending into instability and conflict.

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