A former lead prosecutor in special counsel Robert Mueller’s “Russian interference” case, Andrew Weissmann, argues in the New York Times that it’s too easy to obtain a grand jury indictment against government employees such as former FBI Director James Comey; New York Attorney General Letitia James, or former Obama CIA Director John Brennan.
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Weissmann believes that President Trump is engaging in unwarranted, “vindictive” prosecution. He provides no supporting facts for that belief, but that’s not what he’s interested in.
Readers can easily see through the hypocrisy of Weissmann’s claims of vindictiveness by the president, who was subject to an onslaught of corrupt “lawfare” prosecution, in order to block him from the 2024 presidential election ballot; incarcerate him; and ruin his family business.
Weissmann claims that during his time at the previous administration “we assumed that we would be subject to later investigation by the Trump administration. But we kept our heads down and did our work, guided by our highly principled special counsel.” Weissman sounds like he’s already drafting his criminal answer based on a Nuremberg defense.
He now claims there is a “spree of dubious inquests” by the president – -and he has a solution: raise the standard of evidence for grand jury indictment.
Weissmann argues that federal grand jury indictments will be subject to less political abuse if that standard is elevated from “probable,” to “clear and convincing.” Of course, one man’s probable is another man’s convincing, and this does little to get at the heart of the problem, regardless of which side of the political fence you are on.
Even if you accept Weissmann’s argument, and believe that this could reform criminal law procedures for all political parties, standards of evidence are only half the answer (whether the standards should be throttled up or down, I discuss in a minute).
When prosecutors instruct grand jurors, who are simply laymen assembled from the public, that meeting is private. The defendant is not present, nor his lawyer. The prosecutor has complete control over what evidence is presented to the grand jury, and how it is presented; moreover, the prosecutor is under no obligation to include any exculpatory evidence; that is, evidence that could exonerate a defendant, or create doubts about his guilt. That makes the standard of proof test effectively moot. It is somewhat like asking a trial jury to convict with only one side of the story. But the indictment is just that: it leads toward a fact-testing trial, and presumption of innocence, due process, and other rights are not infringed upon.
However, that private hearing record is also kept private, unless the defendant can succeed in gaining disclosure of its contents under a showing of “particularized need,” which is a high standard, and rarely successful. Without that record, defense may be compromised.
So, in order to theoretically lessen vindictive prosecution, while balancing the rights of a defendant, the standard of proof for indictment might be raised, but the standard of disclosure would have to be lowered.
The problem is that what might be seen as vindictive, may turn out to be vindication, and in the public interest. In the president’s case, this must be acknowledged.
Mr. Weissmann also ignores alternative ways to get at the bottom of partisan legal abuse, by removing it entirely from the court system. Former government officials can be presented before an open panel in a public forum where “sunshine” is indeed a disinfectant. The secrecy of grand jury work is part of the problem, and attorneys like the law to be an “insider” game that they control.
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The concept of grand juries goes back to 12th century England, when they were thought a safeguard against the whims of a king. Much has been written about grand jury reform, but precious little about larger legal reform.
Such reform includes how to deter and police partisan government actors like Comey, and many others, from organizing, participating in, or sanctioning lawfare operations in the first place, rather than prosecuting them after the fact. The objective is to make potential law-breaking expensive, and even painful. Good law works by deterrence.
Perhaps international law has something to say about how we can better deter political corruption. In some countries, the kind of bad behavior that the DNC has institutionalized, is quickly judged treasonous, or criminal, or merely against national security interests, and the punishment, serious. That is why such punishment works: it prevents, or discourages, serious law-breaking — beforehand. In the U.S., politicians can flout the law, because the risks are low.
Perhaps international law has something to say about how we can better deter political corruption. In some countries, the kind of bad behavior that the DNC has institutionalized, is quickly judged treasonous, or criminal, or merely against national security interests, and the punishment, serious. That is why such punishment works: it prevents, or discourages, serious law-breaking—beforehand. In the U.S., politicians can flout the law, because the risks are low.
By raising evidence standards, Weissmann’s judicial philosophy seems to be “catch me if you can.”
Open borders, sponsored illegal immigration, political black operations and more, would be weighed more carefully, if the risks of punishment were elevated, rather than the standards of evidence. In fact, they should move in opposite directions to be optimally efficient: punishment higher and the standards lower.
Raising mere evidence standards after the fact, only invites ways to game them once inside the legal system. That system’s corruption is also part of the problem, as President Trump experienced first hand, and as his administration experiences every week by a judiciary acting under partisan interests. Judges also need to of the law.
Mr. Weissmann is in reality, protecting his political party by burdening investigations and dissuading them, before a trial can test the facts, or a confession or plea can materialize. Raising standards of evidence for indictments may thwart some questionable investigations in some cases, but lowering them might make those investigations unnecessary.
Are current rules of evidence already too low? Perhaps they are not low enough: Weissmann doesn’t consider that lowering them to police standards of suspicion could make government bureaucrats think twice about their own conduct, and keep them “in their lane” rather than breaking the law and then hiding behind more legalese over evidence.
Matthew G. Andersson is a former CEO and law and policy author. He has testified before the U.S. Senate and is a graduate of the University of Chicago.
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