There is more to the story of Rep. Eric Swalwell’s relationship with suspected Chinese intelligence operative Fang Fang, who went by Christine Fang in the U.S. Many knew she had helped with fundraising and referred potential interns to his office before abruptly returning to China amid FBI scrutiny. However, a recently declassified shows that the FBI attempted to develop Fang as a source for a bureau cutout company “in 2013 in the San Francisco area.” Fang’s code name was”Rusty Thumbs.”
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, both of Fang’s parents were “classified as known MSS (Ministry of State Security) intelligence officers,” and Fang claimed this gave her access to “people of influence within the PRC” (People’s Republic of China). Records show that the FBI was interested in developing a “fee-for-service relationship with Fang” because of her potential ability “to report on MSS influence campaigns directed at the U.S. government.”
China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) is the country’s principal civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service, combining functions divided between the CIA and FBI in the U.S. Its formidable operations extend beyond traditional espionage to cyber- and industrial espionage, domestic surveillance, recruitment of foreign sources, and influence operations aimed at foreign governments and political elites.
Fang reportedly told agents she was motivated by “money and power.” According to the record, she was “socially adept,” although there were concerns that she might “exhibit certain egotistical/narcissistic traits which may impact her suitability as a source.” She was involved in “political campaigns, student associations, and community organizations” in an effort to “gain recognition” both in the U.S. and in China. She felt she could garner more recognition in the U.S. than in China.
In addition to Fang’s PRC connections, the FBI was interested in her “connections to various Bay Area city governments” because of their potential to provide “insight into the investment atmosphere” and Chinese business activity in the area. Documents show that Fang sought assistance with her visa and wanted to apply for a Social Security card. It is unclear from the released records whether the FBI ever formally registered Fang as a Confidential Human Source (CHS). However, the record shows that she did “sign an Independent Contractor Agreement and a nondisclosure agreement on June 14, 2013” for the FBI’s front company.
Fang later became the subject of a separate probe, code-named Freshman Fifteen, which opened on March 17, 2014. According to an , the investigation concerned then-Rep. Eric Swalwell’s potential involvement in illegal campaign contributions in exchange for official actions. Investigators described Fang as the alleged “facilitator of a scheme” involving access to Swalwell and internships in his congressional office in exchange for campaign contributions.
Significantly, Fang was “active in assisting U.S. Congressman Eric SWALWELL’s campaign” while the FBI was attempting to develop her as a potential source, according to FBI records. She stated that Swalwell’s campaign for re-election was “currently lacking funds.” Fang expressed a desire to “contribute personally to his campaign” but was aware that “it was illegal since she was a foreign national.” She told the FBI’s undercover employee (UCE) she “was good at convincing other people to contribute.”
Investigators later reported that Fang used American citizens as conduits to conceal herself as the foreign-national source of campaign contributions. The FBI said financial analysis showed Fang orchestrated such contributions at least twice in 2013 and twice more in 2014 and specifically concluded that the 2013 contributions “trace to Fang herself.”
Federal election law prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions in connection with American elections, directly or indirectly. It also prohibits contributions made in another person’s name. The Federal Election Commission specifically warns that reimbursing another person for a political contribution can constitute an illegal contribution in the name of another. FBI investigators believed that Fang’s conduct fit that pattern.
One witness attending a Swalwell fundraiser at Fang’s invitation. According to the FBI FD-302 memorializing the interview, Fang told the witness to bring his checkbook and offered to reimburse him for his contribution. The witness declined. Another FBI memorandum reported that Fang offered to arrange a meeting with Swalwell in return for a $5,000 contribution and allegedly indicated that arranging an internship would “cost more.”
In March 2015, as part of the investigation, the FBI sought authorization for a confidential human source to make a bona fide campaign contribution to Swalwell’s campaign. The FBI’s contemporaneous electronic communication again stated that Fang had used conduits “to conceal herself as a prohibited Foreign National source.” An FBI source report dated March 24 records that the confidential source provided Fang with his credit card information for a $1,000 donation.
The files also reveal more about Fang’s access to Swalwell. During a May 2015 FBI interview, Swalwell acknowledged having “physical relations” with Fang on a handful of occasions, although he told investigators they had never dated or maintained a romantic relationship. The New York Post, citing the declassified files, reported that Fang once showed up at his Swalwell’s East Bay apartment and told him she wasn’t wearing underwear. Their last encounter was in March 2015.
Swalwell also acknowledged that Fang referred prospective interns to his offices. He told investigators those applicants went through the normal selection process. In a later interview, however, he described Fang as “unique” regarding intern referrals because he associated her with the Asian Pacific Islander American Public Affairs Association and treated individuals she recommended accordingly.
The investigation’s stated objectives included obtaining evidence sufficient to “indict and arrest Swalwell and Fang” for campaign finance violations and alleged quid-pro-quo exchanges. However, in February 2017, the FBI formally reported that the investigation had “not found violations of federal corruption statutes perpetrated by Congressman Eric Swalwell.” The Bureau therefore retitled the investigation to focus on Fang, stating that the investigation had instead revealed campaign finance violations perpetrated by her.
In a May 2017 closing communication, the FBI said the evidence revealed potential violations by Fang involving prohibited contributions in another person’s name, foreign national contributions, falsification or destruction of records, false statements or writings, international bulk cash smuggling, and acting as an unregistered foreign agent. The communication further stated that investigators had not uncovered evidence of a quid-pro-quo exchange between Fang and Swalwell or his office. Thus, the newly released documents do not establish that Swalwell knowingly participated in Fang’s alleged illegal campaign finance operation.
The declassified documents also show that Freshman Fifteen was reviewed by DOJ’s Public Integrity Section while Jack Smith headed that section from 2010 through the end of January 2015. However, the records do not establish that Smith personally supervised or made decisions in Freshman Fifteen. By 2017, when the investigation was reclassified to focus exclusively on Fang, Smith had long since left the section; the FBI record instead identifies Public Integrity official Richard Pilger in connection with that decision.
Notably, Fang ultimately left the United States and was subsequently barred from re-entry. After consultation with FBI San Francisco executive management and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California, the Bureau concluded that prosecution was “non-viable due to national security reasons.” The those national security reasons. What national security considerations made prosecution non-viable remains unanswered in the declassified record.
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Image: J via Flickr, CC BY 2.0.